Equity, dened as reward according to contribution, is considered a central aspect 13 of human fairness in both philosophical debates and scientic research. Despite large 14 amounts of research on the evolutionary origins of fairness, the evolutionary rationale 15 behind equity is still unknown. Here, we investigate how equity can be understood in the 16 context of the cooperative environment in which humans evolved. We model a population 17 of individuals who cooperate to produce and divide a resource, and choose their cooperative 18 partners based on how they are willing to divide the resource. Agent-based simulations, 19 an analytical model, and extended simulations using neural networks provide converging 20 evidence that equity is the best evolutionary strategy in such an environment: individuals 21 maximize their tness by dividing benets in proportion to their own and their partners' 22 relative contribution. The need to be chosen as a cooperative partner thus creates a 23 selection pressure strong enough to explain the evolution of preferences for equity. We 24 discuss the limitations of our model, the discrepancies between its predictions and empirical 25 data, and how interindividual and intercultural variability t within this framework. 26
For centuries, philosophers have emphasized the important role of proportionality in hu-30 man fairness. In the fourth century BC, Aristotle suggested an "equity formula" for fair 31 distributions (Aristotle, 1999) , mathematical equivalent of "reward according to contribu-32 tion," whereby the ratios between the outputs O and inputs I of two persons A and B are 33 made equal:
. This formula also captures the concept of "merit," the idea that 34 people who work harder deserve more benets (Adams, 1963; Konow, 2003; Skitka, 2012) . 35
Psychological research on distributive justice, and on equity theory in particular, has 36 oered extensive empirical support for Aristotle's claim (Adams, 1963; Homans, 1958; 37 Walster et al ., 1973; Mellers, 1982) . Equity theory aims to predict the situations in which 38 people will nd that they are treated unfairly. A robust nding is that receiving more or 39 less than what one deserves leads to distress and attempts to restore equity by increasing 40 or decreasing one's contribution (Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobsen, 1964) . People prefer 41 income distributions with strong work-salary correlations, prefer to give more to individ-42 uals whose input is more valuable, and favor meritocratic distributions as a whole in both 43 micro-and macro-justice contexts . 44
More recently, experiments with economics games have shown that participants con-45 sistently divide the product of cooperative interactions in proportion to each individual's 46 talent, eort, and the resources invested in the interaction (Cappelen et al., 2010; Frohlich 47 et al., 2004 ). Meritocratic distributions have been observed across many societies (Mar-48 shall et al., 1999) , including hunter-gatherer societies (Gurven, 2004; Alvard, 2002; Liénard 49 et al., 2013; Schäfer et al., 2015) , and can be detected very early in human development 50 (Kanngiesser et al., 2010; Baumard et al., 2012) , suggesting that equity could be a universal 51 and innate pattern in human psychology. 52 Preferences for equitable outcomes present the same evolutionary problem as prefer-53 ences for fair outcomes in general: at least in the short term, those preferences are costly. 54
Partner choice also has interesting consequences for the evolution of fairness. It leads to 81 equal divisions of resources in theoretical and empirical settings (André and Baumard, 82 2011; Debove et al., 2015b,a) , because when individuals can choose whom to cooperate 83 with then they are better o refusing divisions that do not compensate their opportunity 84 costs. These results suggest the way through which partner choice could also explain the 85 evolution of divisions proportional to contributions: if greater contributors have larger 86 opportunity costs, they will choose partners who give them something at least equal to 87 these opportunity costs. Nonetheless, this hypothesis has never been studied formally. 88 To summarize, preferences for equity are robust and widespread in humans, but we 89 currently lack an evolutionary explanation for their costly existence. Here, we aim to 90 put the partner choice mechanism to the test to see if it can explain such preferences. We 91 develop models in which individuals put eort into the production of a collective good, and 92 dier with regard to both the amount of eort they are willing to put in and the eciency 93 of their contribution to the production of the good. To determine the evolutionarily stable 94 sharing strategy in this environment, we rst analyzed an evolutionary model using agent-95 based simulations. We then developed a simple analytical model to better understand 96 the simulations, and tested the robustness of our results by performing simulations with 97 evolving neural networks as more realistic decision-making devices. The results provide 98 converging support for the conclusion that when individuals can choose whom to cooperate 99 with, equity emerges as the best strategy, and the oers that maximize tness are those 100 that are proportional to the individual's relative contribution to the production of the 101 good. 102 2 Methods 103 We develop three complementary sets of simulations and an analytical model. For clarity, 104 we present the rst set of simulations in details before explaining how the other sets dier. 105 Source code for all simulations is available online. 106 2.1 Simulations Set 1: two productivities 107 2. 1.1 Individuals 108
We consider a population of n individuals who will be given multiple opportunities to 109 cooperate and produce resources during their life. Cooperation only takes place in dyadic 110 interactions. We assume individuals are characterized by a "productivity", such that some 111 individuals can produce more resources than others when they cooperate. Individuals can 112 be of one of two productivities: low-productivity individuals can produce a resources when 113 they cooperate, while high-productivity individuals can produce b resources (b > a). This 114 productivity is constant across the entire life of an individual but is not heritable: at birth, 115 each individual is randomly attributed a level of productivity that is independent of his 116 parent's. This condition is necessary so that there is always a diversity of productivities 117 in the population at each generation. 118 To decide with whom they will cooperate and how to divide resources, we assume 119 that each individual is characterized by eight genetic variables: four r ij and four MAR ij 120 variables, with i and j ∈ {HP, LP }, denoting an individual's productivity (HP = High-121 Productivity, LP = Low-Productivity). r ij is the fraction of resources (between 0 and 1) 122 that an individual of productivity i will give to an individual of productivity j. We call 123 the r ij variables the reward variables. MAR ij is the minimum acceptable reward, the 124 minimum fraction of resource that an individual of productivity i is ready to accept from 125 an individual of productivity j. Only two types of events can happen at any given time in our model: the encounter 128 of two solitary individuals, or the split of two cooperating individuals. We model time 129
Conversely, 1 − p(t) is the probability that this event is a split.
142
Depending on whether the event is an encounter or a split, two scenarios unfold: 143 1/ If the event is an encounter, two solitary individuals are randomly drawn from the 144 population and oered an opportunity to cooperate to produce resources. To this end, 145 one of the two individuals is randomly selected to unilaterally decide how to divide the 146 resources through her r ij reward variable. We call this individual the partner. However, 147 before cooperation eectively starts, the partner must be accepted by the second individ-148 ual. We call the second individual the decision maker. The decision maker makes her 149 decision based on her partner's reputation. For simplicity, we do not model the formation 150 of this reputation. We simply assume that the decision maker knows her partner's reward 151 value r ij . For instance, a HP partner A has a reputation of r A HP LP with a LP decision 152 maker B. The LP decision maker will then compare the value of r A HP LP to her own 153 MAR B LP HP , and if r A HP LP ≥ MAR B LP HP , the partner will be accepted and cooperation will start. From this point on until the interaction stops, the two individuals produce, at 155 each unit of time, an amount of resources that is equal to the sum of their respective pro-156 ductivities, from which the decision maker receives a fraction r A HP LP . Conversely, if the partner's reputation is not good enough for the decision maker (r A HP LP < MAR B LP HP ), 158 the two individuals do not cooperate together and go back to the pool of solitary individ-159 uals without receiving any resources. 160 2/ If the event is a split, a pair of cooperating individuals is randomly chosen to split, 161 and the two individuals go back to the pool of solitary individuals. 162
2.1.3
The cost of partner choice.
163
The cost of partner choice is implicit in our model. It is a consequence of the time it 164 takes to nd a partner. Hence, the cost and benet of being choosy are not controlled by 165 explicit parameters, but by two parameters that characterize the "uidity" of the social 166 market: the "encounter rate" β, and the "split rate" τ . Rather than having only two productivities a and b in our population, we assume in 206 Simulations Set 2 that the productivity of an individual at birth is sampled from a uniform 207 distribution between a and b. In this situation, individuals never interact with a partner of 208 the exact same productivity. This constitutes a challenge for modeling in that individuals 209 would need to be equipped with an innity of r ij and MAR ij traits to react to the innity 210 of possible contributions by their partner (Gavrilets and Scheiner, 1993) . 211
To solve this problem, we do not characterize anymore individuals with r ij and MAR ij 212 traits, but instead endow them with two three-layer feedforward neural networks (one 213 network to produce the rewards, and another one to produce the MARs). Both neural 214 networks have the same structure: two input neurons, ve hidden neurons, and a single 215 output neuron. The rst neural network is used when playing the role of partner: it senses 216 an individual's own productivity and that of her decision maker, and produces the reward 217 as output. The second network is used when playing the role of decision maker: it senses an 218 individual's own productivity and that of her partner, and produces the MAR as output. 219
Each network has its own set of synaptic weights (see Fig. 3A and SM section A.2), that 220 are transmitted genetically. Because evolution now operates on these weights, and not on 221 rewards or MARs directly, individuals can now evolve a reaction norm. They can evolve a 222 function that produces outputs even from inputs they have never encountered before (i.e., 223 individuals of new productivities). This property of neural networks is important in our 224 case, because equity is precisely a relationship between two quantities, contribution and 225 reward. Seeing whether natural selection will be able to recreate the same relationship of 226 proportionality between contribution and reward using simple neural networks is thus of 227 great interest. All other methodological details for Simulations Set 2 are the same as in 228
Simulations Set 1. 229
Simulations Set 3 230
As a nal test of the robustness of our model, we test whether natural selection also 231 favors divisions proportional to contributions when contribution is measured in terms of 232 time invested into cooperation (instead of productivity). We present the details of these 233 simulations and its results in SM section A.1. 234 3 Results
235
We rst present the results for Simulations Set We present the case where high-productivity individuals are able to produce twice as 240 much resources as low-productivity individuals (a = 1, b = 2). Figure 1 We modelled a population of individuals choosing each other for cooperation. When dier-285 ent contributions to cooperation are made, resource divisions proportional to contributions 286 evolve. Individuals producing more resources or investing more time into cooperation re-287 ceive more resources than individuals producing or investing less. Asking for divisions that 288 match one's own contribution, and proposing such divisions to others, constitutes the best 289 strategy when partner choice is possible. In other terms, a preference for equity maximizes 290 tness in an environment where individuals can choose their cooperative partners. 291 It is important to note that our results cannot be summarized as "a preference for 292 equity helps individuals to be chosen as a partner" or "a preference for equity helps avoid 293 interactions with selsh partners." This is only half of the story. If the point were only to be 294 chosen as a partner, the best strategy would be to be as generous as possible, an outcome 295 which is sometimes observed in models inspired by competitive altruism theories (Roberts, 296 1998 ). The point here is rather to be chosen as a partner while at the same time avoiding 297 exploitation by being over-generous. Our model clearly shows that the best strategy to 298 solve this problem is to give proportionally to the other's contributionnot less, but also 299 not more. Equity is the result of a trade-o between two evolutionary pressures which 300 work in opposite directions: the pressure to keep being chosen, but also the pressure to 301 choose wisely. 302
This last point is better understood by looking at the precise mechanism through 303 which proportionality evolves. The key factor determining divisions of resources at the 304 evolutionary equilibrium are the opportunity costs of each individual. Opportunity costs 305 represent the benets an individual renounces to when she makes a choice. From an evo-306 lutionary point of view, it is trivial that an individual will want to make the best choices 307 possible to minimize her opportunity costs. Hence, the best strategy to keep being chosen 308 as a cooperative partner is to compensate others' opportunity costs: when individual A 309 agrees to interact with individual B, individual B should give A something equal to A's 310 opportunity costs at the time of making the decision (and vice versa). This is exactly why 311 high-productivity individuals get more in our model: high-productivity individuals have 312 larger opportunity costs than low-productivity individuals. Suppose that low-productivity 313 individuals produce 1 unit of a resource whereas high-productivity individuals produce 2. 314
High-productivity individuals thus have the possibility to produce 4 resources when they 315 interact with other high-productivity individuals, leaving them with 2 resources on av-316 erage (see exactly why in SM section C.1). 2 resources is thus the opportunity cost of 317 high-productivity individuals when they agree to cooperate with low-productivity indi-318 viduals. Thus, if low-productivity individuals want to be good partners, they will have 319 to compensate high-productivity individuals' opportunity costs and give them exactly 2 320 resources (out of 3 produced), which will result in a proportional oer of 66%. But low-321 productivity individuals should not give more neither, because they also have access to 322 interactions in which they could gain 1 unit on average (when they cooperate with other 323 low-productivity individuals). In other words, low-productivity individuals have oppor-324 tunity costs of 1, and should thus not accept divisions leaving them with less than 1. 325 Our current model and previous papers on the subject (André and Baumard, 2011; De-326 bove et al., 2015b,a) push forward the idea that the sense of fairness is a psychological 327 mechanism evolved to compensate others' opportunity costs and minimize one's own op-328 portunity costs. This characterization only comes from models investigating fairness in 329 distributive situations though, so it would be interesting to see if it holds in more diverse, 330 non-distributive situations. 331
Our model has several limitations, which need to be acknowledged. First, while we 332 suppose that individuals choose each other based on their reputation, we do not explicitly 333 model the formation of this reputation. Individuals automatically know the reputation 334 of others and this reputation is reliable. It could be interesting to relax this assumption, 335 especially because reputation formation (through communication for instance) might be 336 an important point that distinguishes humans from non-human primates. Second, the 337 population we model does not match the hunter-gatherer population in the sense that it 338 is not structured. This is important because a structure, such as camps or family units, 339 could potentially aect opportunities to choose partners. Finally, it might be interesting to 340 model the evolution of fairness in a wider range of cooperative interactions than we have 341 considered here (outside distributive situations for instance). All of these assumptions 342 should be relaxed in future studies. 343
Partner choice is not the only evolutionary mechanism postulated to lead to the evo-344 lution of fairness in the literature. Some authors have argued that fairness could be 345 explained by empathy (Page and Nowak, 2002) , spite (Huck and Oechssler, 1999; Barclay 346 and Stoller, 2014; Forber and Smead, 2014), "noisy" processes such as drift or learning 347 mistakes (Gale et al., 1995; Rand et al., 2013) , the existence of a spatial population struc-348 ture Killingback and Studer, 2001) , or alternating oers (Rubinstein, 349 1982; Hoel, 1987) . But as we explained in the introduction, all of these models equate 350 fairness with equality, and it is thus unknown whether they can explain a more general 351 case. Testing whether those models pass the "equity test" will be an excellent way to 352 compare and decide between these models, a necessary undertaking that has been largely 353 neglected. The extensive literature on bargaining in economics (Binmore, 1986 Talking about bargaining theory suggests alternative interpretations of our model. It 367 might be argued that human fairness is the result of bargaining at the proximal level, the 368 result of rational cognitive processes. We argue instead that the "bargaining" already took 369 place at the ultimate level by means of natural selection, and that the result of this bar-370 gaining is the existence of a genuine sense of fairness which "automatically" makes humans 371 prefer equitable strategies. This hypothesis does not exclude the possibility that humans 372 are also capable of consciously bargaining based on their opportunity costs, but this be-373 havior would not be the product of an evolved sense of fairness. While our model bears a 374 great resemblance to historical market models (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990 ) and other 375 models in economics in which fair outcomes have sometimes been observed (Rubinstein, 376 1982; Binmore, 2005) , we emphasize that the markets we model are ultimate biological 377 markets (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994; Noë et al., 2001 ). This is not just an empty ter-378 minological variation: locating markets at the ultimate level has important implications 379 for our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying fairness. Among other 380 things, it allows us to understand why fairness does not seem to be based on self-interest at 381 the psychological level even if fairness evolved for self-interested reasons (Baumard et al., 382 2013; Trivers, 1971) . 383
Another alternative interpretation of our model remains. One could agree that fairness 384 judgments are based on simple automatic rules rather than complex conscious calculations, 385 but argue that those rules could have evolved culturally rather than biologically. This is 386 not an issue that can be settled theoretically, as the same models can always be interpreted 387 as instances of biological or cultural evolution. To date, we denitely lack empirical data to 388 answer this question with certainty, but the idea of a biologically evolved sense of fairness 389 is not made absurd by the existing data. As early as the age of 12 months, children react remind us that many researchers expect that prosocial behaviors traditionally associated 398 with the existence of human institutions, religions, or cultural artefacts can also evolve 399 biologically. In fact, Robert Trivers himself recognized that the most important implication 400 of his seminal paper on the evolution of reciprocity (Trivers, 1971 ) was that "it laid the 401 foundation for understanding how a sense of justice evolved" (Trivers, 2006) . In fact, while interindividual and intercultural variations have crystallized the debate, 423 intra-individual variation can also be observed even in Western countries. In some sit-424 uations we behave as meritocrats, requiring pay for each additional hour of presence at 425 work (Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobsen, 1964) , whereas the next day on a camping trip 426 with strangers we behave more like egalitarians, without constant monitoring and book-427 keeping of our contributions and those of others (Cohen, 2009 ). Neither our brain (the 428 algorithm) nor our culture has changed in the meantime. What has changed is the way 429 we interpret the situation (part of the input to the algorithm). This idea needs to be de-430 veloped more formally, and we do not suggest that it is the only way to explain variation, 431 but it may constitute a fruitful avenue of research. 432 Another interesting question is the prevalence of equity in traditional societies. We 433 have mentioned anthropological records of distributions according to eort (Gurven, 2004; 434 Kaplan and Gurven, 2005), but it is also well known that hunter-gatherers transfer meat 435 in a way that not does not seem to respect equity. This type of interaction has been 436 called "generalized reciprocity" by Sahlins (1972) as predicting the evolution of strict equity with immediate input/output matching, but 448 more generally as input/output matching over a long time and across dierent cooperative 449 activities ("generalized equity"). 450
We conclude by noting that proportionality is important in distributive justice but is 451 also a cornerstone of institutional justice, wherein oenders are punished in proportion 452 to the severity of their crimes (Hoebel, 1954 Having a higher productivity is only one way to contribute more to a cooperative in-464 teraction. Another natural way is to spend more time to amass resources. To test the 465 robustness of our partner choice mechanism, we thus created a third set of simulations in 466 which there are no more dierences of productivity between individuals, but one of the 467 two individuals in a cooperating dyad has to invest m times more time than her part-468 ner. We thus model the possibility that there is a cooperative role more time-consuming 469 than the other. In practice, we model this by randomly attributing a high investment All other methodological details for Simulations Set 3 are the same as in Simulations 483 Set 1. In particular, we start from a population of individuals giving zero reward even 484 when they invest less time into cooperation, and observe what will be the relationship 485 between contribution (time invested) and rewards at the evolutionary equilibrium. When applying mutations, to avoid networks to fall in suboptimal local maxima, mu-503 tations on the synaptic weights are drawn from a uniform distribution with a small proba-504 bility 0.05 ; otherwise they ar drawn in a normal distribution centered around the synaptic 505 weight's value. 506
B
Analytical model. 507 We developed an analytical model to model the situation where individuals dier by their 508 productivity (but not eort), and where only two productivities coexist in the population. 509 When individuals reject an interaction, however, they are forced to postpone their social 516 interaction to a later encounter. We assume that this entails an explicit cost expressed 517 as a discounting factor δ (0 ≤ δ < 1). If we call the average payo of an individual of 518 productivity i G i , then δG i will be the average expected payo in the next interaction 519 after rejecting an oer. When δ equals 1, refusing an interaction carries no cost; when δ 520 equals 0, refusing an interaction will result in zero payo from the next interaction. In 521 practice, we will neglect the case where δ equals 1, as it leads to artefactual results (see 522 below). 523
The assumption that only partners can decide of the division in our model is necessary 524 so that the evolution of fairness is not explained trivially. When only one individual can 525 decide, natural selection favors selshness (André and Baumard, 2011) . This is easy to 526 understand. On the one hand, whatever reward a partner suggests, accepting it brings 527 a greater gain than rejecting it for the decision maker. Therefore, in all cases, natural 528 selection favors indiscriminate partners, with decision makers taking whatever benets 529 are made available to them. On the other hand, and as a result, selection favors stingy 530 partners, oering the minimal possible amount. Because decision makers are in such an 531 inferior bargaining position, in the following analysis we will focus on decision makers' 532 and not partners'payos. A decision maker receiving a large share of the resource is a 533 strong indication that there are evolutionary forces at work against the expected partners' 534 selshness. 535
All our analyses assume that (i) individuals enter the population at a constant rate, 536
(ii) evolution is slow compared to an individual's lifespan (and thus ) (iii) mutations are 537 rare, and that (iv) there is no recombination between genetic traits (p ij and q ij ). As a 538 consequence of (i) and (ii), the composition of the population does not change during an 539 individual's life. As a consequence of (iii) and (iv), at any evolutionary equilibrium, all the 540 strategies present in the population must reach the same payo for individuals of a given 541 strength (only a high mutation rate or recombination rate could continuously re-introduce 542 maladaptive strategies in the population, yielding a variance of payos at each generation). 543
Here we ask the same question answered in the main paper through simulations: how 544 will the behavioural traits r ij and MAR ij (i and j ∈ {HP, LP }) evolve in an environment 545 where LP and HP individuals coexist and share resources? As a reminder, MAR LP HP 546 reads as "the minimum reward that a LP individual will accept from a HP individual," 547 and r HP LP as "the reward a HP individual will give to a LP individual." should evolve toward the minimum that decision makers will accept, individuals will 574 always demand and accept exactly δG i , no matter who they are interacting with 575 (regardless of their partner's productivity). We thus have: 576 578 Knowing (1) and (2), it can be shown that partners are always better o giving their 579 decision makers what they "ask for" (δG i ) at the evolutionary equilibrium, as long 580 as δ < 1. The reasoning is as follows.
581
Suppose that at the evolutionary equilibrium, all LP individuals refuse to give HP 582 individuals what they ask for, namely δG HP (but all other demands are satised).
583
The average social payo of a LP individual in this population is then 584 
592
Similarly, the payo of a HP individual in this population is 593 it is easy to show that it is never possible that δG LP ≥ a + b − δG HP as long as 601 δ < 1. In other words, at the evolutionary equilibrium, it is impossible that all LP 602 individuals refuse to oer δG HP to HP individuals, because they would gain more 603 from doing so. 604
What if there was some polymorphism in the population such that only some LP 605 individuals refuse to give HP individuals what they ask for? The average social 606 payo of those LP individuals is still written the same as in equation (3). But 607 because we know that at the evolutionary equilibrium all individuals with the same 608 productivity must gain the same payo, the payo of all LP individuals will be the 609 same, regardless of phenotype. The coexistence of two types of LP individuals in the 610 population would imply that δG LP = a + a − δG HP (the payo of the two types of 611 LP individuals in the position of partner when paired with HP individuals is equal), 612 but as we showed above, this is not possible as long as δ < 1. As a consequence, it is 613 not only impossible that all LP individuals refuse to give HP individuals what they 614 want at the evolutionary equilibrium, it is also impossible that some LP individuals 615 refuse to give HP individuals what they want as long as δ < 1.
616
Following the same reasoning, it can be shown that it is not possible for some individ-617 uals (of any productivity) to refuse to give their social partner (of any productivity) 618 what they ask for at the evolutionary equilibrium as long as LP individuals what they ask for. This condition reects the fact that if the dier-621 ence of productivity between HP and LP individuals is too large, it is more benecial 622 for LP individuals to interact with HP individuals than with LP individuals. As we 623 will see though, this is only possible when partner choice is costly. Moreover, as long 624 as a b > 0.5, as is the case in our simulations, it is not worth it for LP individuals 625 to refuse to interact with other LP individuals, and so all partners will give their 626 decision makers what they want at the evolutionary equilibrium. 627
If a b > δ(x−1) δx−2 , we can thus write: δx−2 , from step 3. it directly results that no reward is ever rejected at 631 the evolutionary equilibrium, because each partner's reward is exactly equal to the 632 decision maker's MAR, and thus each reward is accepted. If no reward is ever refused, 633 the average payo of LP and HP individuals respectively can be written as: 634
Solving this system gives us an expression for G HP and G LP as a function of x and 635 δ at the evolutionary equilibrium:
From (5) 
Solving this system gives us an expression for G HP and G LP as a function of x and δ 652 at the evolutionary equilibrium: 653 Situation D was already proven to be impossible at the evolutionary equilibrium in 672 the previous section. We now show that the same holds for the 14 remaining situations, 673 except in situation C. We give the expected social payo of HP and LP individuals in 674 each situation. We also give the condition that must be satised for each situation to be 675 possible at the evolutionary equilibrium; it is then straightforward to show that, given our 676 parameter values (0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ < 1 ), this condition can never be satised.
677
Situation A: 678
Situation C: 682 These eects explain why a quick look at the evolved strategies of individuals is not 766 always enough to nd a pattern of proportionality. This is especially true with neural 767 networks working on a continuum of productivities or eort. While, as we have shown, 768 the theoretical tness-maximizing behavior is to oer an amount proportional to one's 769 own relative contribution, it is not necessarily the case that neural networks will produce 770 proportional oers for the whole range of inputs they are exposed to. Imagine an individual 771 who oers proportional rewards only to the best producers in the population, while oering 772 less-than-proportional rewards to other individuals. At the evolutionary equilibrium, our 773 model predicts that these unfair rewards will be rejected. But as long as nding a new 774 partner is not costly, being rejected does not lead to a loss of tness. As a consequence, 775 any individual can oer less-than-proportional rewards to a fraction of the population, as 776 long as another fraction still accepts the rewards she makes that are proportional. In other 777 words, individuals can specialize in oering proportional rewards to only a fraction of the 778 range of productivities in the population, and stop interacting with the remaining fraction. 779
Because they stop interacting, the rewards oered to this fraction become subject to drift. 780 Because of this mechanism, it is possible that averaging the output of dierent evolved 781 neural networks does not reveal a pattern of proportionality. In our simulations, averaging 782 the output of 15,000 neural networks producing MARs yielded an almost perfect propor-783 tional relationship between contributions and MARs (main paper, Fig. 3C ). Plotting the 784 average output of 15,000 neural networks producing rewards did not show such a perfectly 785 proportional relationship, although it was not far from it. Here, it is important to remem-786 ber that despite this variability in the rewards that are extended, proportionality prevails 787 when we look only at the interactions that actually take place: only proportional rewards 788 are accepted at the evolutionary equilibrium, as evidenced in Fig. 3B of the main article. 789
Finally, problems of neutrality add complexity to the analysis. Although at the begin-790 ning of our simulations raising MARs drove the evolution of proportional rewards, once 791 proportional rewards had spread in the population, the selection pressure to maintain high 792
MARs disappeared: if all individuals oer rewards of r, requesting r or r − as a decision 793 maker brings the same payo. Because of drift, MARs can thus start to decrease, and 794 in turn partners will be selected to decrease their rewards to try to exploit those unde-795 manding decision makers. This exploitation cannot last for long, as it soon revives the 796 selection pressure to increase MARs, but the dynamic exists. Although it is rather easy to 797 conceptualize why, under appropriate conditions, partner choice leads to proportionality, 798 the actual dynamics underlying this result are far from straightforward to understand. Figure 4 : Evolution of the average reward accepted, depending on whether partners invest twice as much or half as much time into cooperation. Individuals investing twice as much time receive twice as much resources at equilibrium, and vice-versa.
